The Nusayris Under the French Mandate
The Nusayris
Under the French Mandate
During World War I, France and Britain signed the notorious secret Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) which divided Syria, including Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq, among the great powers. In 1919, the League of Nations placed Syria under French mandate which came into effect in the next year. Beginning in 1918, the French forces stationed in Cilicia, in southern Turkey, moved into parts of Lebanon and Syria, including the coastal area of the Nusayri territory. General Gouraud was appointed the General Commander of the Allied occupation forces in Syria and Cilicia, and made Beirut his headquarters.
In the spring of 1919, the King-Crane Commission was sent by U.S. President Wilson to investigate the political aspirations of the Arabs, especially those in Syria. The Amir Faysal and his men declared the establishment of an Arab state in Syria at Damascus in 1920. This move was considered by France an effort to her role as the trustee of the Levant. On 24 July, a French force defeated a much smaller and badly equipped Arab army at Maysalun. King Faysal abdicated the Syrian throne and fled Damascus, leaving France the master of Syria.
On 1 September 1920, General Gouraud divided the French mandate territory into four districts: Greater Lebanon, state of Damascus (including the Druze Mountain), the state of Aleppo (including al Iskandarun, or Alexandretta), and the territory of Latakia (Alawi territory).[1]
At this time, the Nusayris were called Alawis, and their territory, which became a “state” on 1 July 1922, called Dawlat al Alawiyyin (the Alawis state); in 1933 it became the government of Latakia.[2]
The fragmentation of the Syrian population into many ethnic, religious, and political groups made it easier for the French to control the country, following the policy of “divide and rule.” Since the urban Sunni Muslims refused to enrol their sons in the army, the French authorities encouraged the minority groups, especially the Nusayris, to enlist. Thus, following the example of the British levy, the French formed Les Troupes Spéciales du Levant, consisting mostly of Nusayri recruits. Many Nusayris who were poor and could not afford an education for their sons had them join the army to save expenses. Once these Nusayris gained high-ranking positions in the army, they encouraged their relatives to follow suit.[3]
The enrolment of the Nusayris in the army during the Mandate period was beginning of their movement toward control of the army in the 1950s and 1960s and their ultimate rise to political power in 1970. The French even used the military corps of minority groups to suppress nationalist insurrections[4]
There is evidence that many Nusayris cooperated with the French authorities in the hope of securing the position of their sect. In a telegram sent to General Gouraud, seventy-three Nusayri chiefs, represented a great number of tribes, asked for an independent Nusayri union under French protection.[5]
The writer Munir al Sharif, a sympathizer with the Nusayris, however, claims to have played an active role in convincing the Nusayris of the north not to cooperate with the French. Al Sharif states that some Nusayris in the northern part of the territory succumbed to the French promises of money, property, and leadership, and unwisely served the French, to the detriment of their own people.[6]
Another writer offers a different picture. Yusuf al Hakim, who occupied a cabinet position in the Arab-Syrian government under Faysal and was a witness to the events during and after World War I states that the Nusayris were loyal to the French mandate authorities as a gesture of gratitude for the care and compassion shown to them by the French.[7]
Al Hakim goes on to say that it was to show their loyalty and gratitude to the French that the Nusayris did not send a representative to the Syrian conference.[8]
In 1919, Faysal had suggested to the Arab-nationalists the necessity of holding a conference of representatives from all of Syria to emphasize the desire of the Syrians for complete independence. The Arab nationalists, who would accept nothing less than complete independence, responded, and the Syrian conference met in July, 1919.[9]
The Nusayris boycotted this conference. Taqi Sharaf al Din voices the opinion that what al Hakim said about relations between the French and the Nusayris is a significant indication of the Nusayris’ antagonism toward the Arab liberation movement and the nationalist aspirations of the Syrian people.[10]
Be that as it may, the French authorities soon had to deal with the fiercest Nusayri revolt yet against French rule, led by Sheikh Salih Ahmed al Ali (d. 1950). On 15 December 1918, al Ali called a meeting at Nahiyat Badr, in the administrative unit of Tartus, attended by prominent Nusayri chiefs. He alerted them to the fact that the French had already occupied the Syrian coast, with the intention of separating that region from the rest of the country. He also told them that as a sign of French antagonism to the Arab nationalists led by Prince Faysal, whose objective was the complete independence of the Arab countries, the French authorities were tearing apart the flags of the Arab rebels. He urged them to revolt and expel the French from Syria[11]
When the French heard about this meeting, they sent a force from Qadmus (home of Ismailis, who had allied themselves to the French) to Badr, to arrest Salih al Ali. Salih al Ali and his men met the French force at the village of Niha, west of Wadi al Uyun, and the revolt began in earnest. The French force was defeated, leaving behind thirty five casualties.[12]
After the victory, al Ali began to organise the rebels into a disciplined military force, fashioned like a regular army with its own general command, officers of various ranks, and ordinary soldiers. Some Nusayri women supported the army of revolt by supplying water and food to the combat troops and replacing the men at work in the fields.[13]
Al Ali also turned against the Ismailis, attacking them at Qadmus, Masyaf, and Nahr al Khawabi. The French authorities rushed to the Ismailis aid, however,[14]
and attacked al Ali on 21 February 1919, but were defeated for the second time.
Meantime, the British General Allenby, commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in the East, asked Sheikh al Ali to cease the hostilities against the French. Al Ali agreed, on condition that the French forces remain only one hour at Badr. When al Ali withdrew his forces of Badr, however, the French broke the condition of his agreement with Allenby. As soon as he arrived in Badr, they installed cannons, took up their positions, and began shelling the villages of Sheikh Badr and al Rastan. The fighting continued throughout the night, ending in a third defeat for the French. After this victory al Ali turned once more against the Ismailis, attacking and plundering the town of Qadmus. He ordered his men to search for Ismaili books and manuscripts, which he piled up and set fire to in the public square. The Ismailis regained Qadmus in their counter attack on 17 April 1920, however.[15]
(Commenting on the hostilities between the Ismailis and the Nusayris, Col. Paul Jacquot states that they constitute separate entities and religion, yet neither is a true Muslim religion[16]
After this time al Ali was joined by many Nusayri chiefs and prominent Sunni Muslims from Latakia, al Haffa, Tartus, Banyas, and other homes and villages.[17]
In July 1919, a French force attacked the rebel positions, but al Ali retaliated by attacking and occupying the villages of the Ismailis, the allies of the French, leaving the French no alternative but to sue for peace. Al Ali agreed to peace on certain conditions; that the Syrian seacoast be added to the state of Syria: that Nusayri captives be released; and the Nusayris be compensated for the damages caused to their villages and homes by the French army. Thus, peace was concluded between the French and al Ali. But the French were not sincere in their deal with al Ali and violated their peace agreement by occupying and burning the village of Kaf al Jaz. Al Ali counteracted by occupying Qadmus from which the French conducted their military operation against him.
On 20 February 1920, al Ali attacked the city of Tartus, but counterattacks by the French fleet off the coast caused his forces to retreat. On 3 April, the French attacked, causing heavy casualties and much damage, but Ali’s forces counterattacked and forced the French to withdraw from the villages they had been occupying. Meanwhile, a French army commanded by Gouraund defeated a small, poorly equipped Arab army at Maysalun on 24 July 1920, occupied Damascus, and ended the short-lived Kingdom of Syria under Faysal. Realizing the gravity of the situation, al Ali attacked the town of Maysaf, which was being held by the French and their Ismaili allies. On 29 November 1920, General Gouraund sent an expedition against al Ali near the village of Ayn Qadib, west of Qadmus, but to no avail. The French forces entered Sheikh Badr without resistance and arrested some Nusayri leaders, jailing some and hanging the others, but al Ali escaped with his forces to the north. The French gave chase; on 15 June 1921, a great French force attacked and overran his positions in the north, but failed to capture al Ali, who went into hiding. The French authorities also offered one-hundred-thousand francs as reward in exchange for information leading to his capture, but this also was to no avail.
When the French authorities gave up hope of finding al Ali, General Gouraund issued an edict pardoning him and had it distributed to the people by plane. Finally, after hiding out for a year, al Ali surrendered to the French General Billote. When Billote asked why he had surrendered, al Ali answered, “By God, if I had only ten armed men left to fight, I would not have quit.” Al Ali died at his home on April 1950.[18]
Sheikh Ahmed Salih al Ali’s campaign was the first revolt against the French imperialism in Syria, but some Arab writers do not see it in that light. Taqi Sharaf al Din maintains that the revolt of al Ali, which the Nusayris use to justify their antagonism to the Arab nationalist movement, was not a reaction to the French occupation of the Syrian coast, although its interactions with other revolts, especially in the cities of the Syrian coast, gave it the resemblance of a nationalist revolt against French imperialism. “After all,” says al Din, “the Nusayris are not ‘material’ for revolt because, more than any other Syrian group, they supported the French forces occupation.”[19]
In fact, he states, the French used the good offices of Nusayri chief, Ahmed al Hamid, to prevail on Sheikh Salih al Ali to cease hostilities and enter into negotiations with them.[20]
Al Din concludes that Salih al Ali’s revolt was the result of the long-standing conflict between the Nusayris and the Ismailis. When the Ismailis allied themselves with the French, al Ali’s attacks were directed against the Ismailis, and only incidentally against their French allies.[21]
Al Ali believes that Prince Faysal, some of whose men fought alongside al Ali’s troops, supported the revolt out of fear of the French imperialistic design on Syria. In fact, Faysal would have supported anyone who revolted against the French imperialism. Faysal appointed al Ali as his representative to the Nusayris’ territory and supported his revolt not because al Ali was an Arab nationalist, but because he was openly hostile towards the French, whom Faysal considered a great impediment to the achievement of Arab independence.[22]
Mustafa Kamal also supported al Ali against the French. Kamal was trying to oust the French army from Cilicia in southern Turkey. In order to pressure the French to withdraw from Cilicia, he furnished al Ali with arms in his struggle against the French. Once Kamal concluded a secret peace treaty with Franklin-Bouillon in October 1921, however, he had no more use for al Ali and ceased supporting him.[23]
The revolt of Salih al Ali against the French authorities, therefore, was not so much an antagonistic reaction to the Arab nationalist aspirations as a Nusayri movement whose objective was independence, or at least the autonomous administration of the Nusayris in their own territory. This is why, as soon as the French mandate authorities declared the establishment of an Alawi (Nusayri) state in 1922 and chose Latakia as its capital, the Nusayris began to support France. It also explains the Nusayris’ failure to support the insurrection of the Arab nationalist in Damascus in 1925-26, which was met by French bombardment from the air. It is true that some Nusayri leaders supported the Arab national movement and collaborated with Prince Faysal, but, for most part, the Nusayris were looking to win the independence of their own territory, which they could obtain from the French authorities, rather than to become part of an all-Syrian Sunni state. The Nusayris feared the “Sunni Wolf,” — that is, the Arab Sunni government in Damascus — more than the French.[24]
They had suffered a great deal from the brutality and neglect of their affairs at the hands of the Ottomans. Now the French were in control of their territory, and they could exact their independence or self-rule from the French, by revolt if necessary. To achieve this aim, the Nusayris had to contend with the French mandate authorities on the other. They were apprehensive of the French mandate as they were of the Syrian nationalists, who were agitating to unite all Syria and Lebanon under the sole control of Syrian government in Damascus.
The Nusayris did not seek an end to the French mandate if the French left, they would have no protection from the Sunnis[25]
Therefore, the Nusayris’ aspiration for self-rule coincided with the French objective of perpetuating the political and religious fragmentation of Syria in order to facilitate their rule of the country.
From 1920 until 1936, when France finally negotiated a treaty with the Syrian nationalists granting Syria self-government, the Nusayris opposed the incorporation of their state into a united Syria under one central government in Damascus. In 1923, the Nusayris refused to join with Damascus and Aleppo to form a “united Syria,” causing General Weygard, who had succeeded Gouraund as High Commissioner, to devise a plan for uniting Damascus and Aleppo, without including the Nusayri state in this union[26]
When the Syrian nationalists revolted against the French in 1925 and demanded absolute independence for an Arab-Syrian state, the Nusayris did not participate in the insurrection. In fact, from 1925 to 1936, a period marked by nationalist riots and insurrection against French rule, the Nusayris vehemently opposed unity with Syria. On 28 April 1933, a Nusayri delegation headed by the president of the representative council of the government of Latakia (the Ali state) arrived in Beirut to express its disagreement with the proposed union with Syria. According to Henri Ponsot, the French high commissioner, the head of the delegation said that the Nusayris opposed any union with Syria, arguing that the Nusayris always lived separately from Syria, and that the Syrian (Sunnis) were hostile to the Nusayris because of their religion.[27]
In the face of mounting nationalist sentiment and demands for independence, France entered into negotiations with the Syrian nationalists in Paris in March, 1936. Nusayri leaders, including members of the representative council of the government of Latakia, submitted several memoranda to the high commissioner opposing union with Syria, stating that such a proposed union should be placed on the agenda of the French-Syrian negotiations.
In a memorandum dated 8 June 1936, the Nusayris said that after generations of living by themselves in the fastness of their mountains, they had developed a natural instinct for independence. Now that the French were occupying their country, some Nusayris, because of this instinct for independence, fought the French, but the majority placed their trust in the honour of the French and believed that the mandate authorities will help them retain this independence, which had been affirmed by all the high commissioners in the name of France. The Nusayris were shocked, therefore, to see the French succumbed to the first blow by the Syrian nationalists, forgetting their promises to keep the Nusayris from being annexed by Syria. They felt that France had no right to bargain away their independence to another country. They reminded the French of their loyalty and trust. They concluded their memorandum by stating that if France wanted to keep this trust, it should issue an official declaration respecting and guaranteeing the independence of the Nusayris under its protection and send a Nusayri delegation representing the Latakia government to Paris to defend that independence. They threatened to resort to civil disobedience if their demands were not met.[28]
In another memorandum, dated 11 June 1936, the signatories stated that the Nusayris, who formed the majority of the Alawi state, refused categorically to return to Islamic rule. France, they contended, could not determine to place a small and friendly people in bondage under the rule of their traditional religious enemies. The signatories requested the French government to delegate a parliamentary committee to their territory to investigate the great chasm separating the Nusayriyyah from the Syrians, and see whether it would be feasible to annex the Nusayri territory to Syria without precipitating a blood bath that would be a black spot in the history of France. They demanded that the French-Syrian negotiations regarding the Nusayris stop at once.[29]
Still another Nusayri memorandum, dated 3 July 1936, affirmed that the signatories were most loyal to France, and that France ought never to defile its honourable history by the crime of uniting the Nusayris with Syria. The signatories reminded the French that even the Crusaders had never established a firm footing or remained very long except in north-western Syria, the Nusayri territory[30]
The most revealing document concerning the aspirations of the Nusayris and their attitude towards Syria and the French is one dated 15 June 1936 and submitted to Leon Blum, head of the Popular Front government. The document was sign by two Nusayri notables, including Sulaiman al Asad, father of the current president of Syria, and Sulaiman al Murshid, who began as a humble cattle herder and became a member of the Syrian parliament in 1937. (Al Murshid claimed to be the Rabb (Lord God) and was used by the French to further their sectarian policy in Syria. He was arrested by the Syrian authorities and hanged in Damascus in 1946.) This memorandum is so significant that we cite it in full:
For the occasion of the current negotiations between France and Syria, we, the leaders and dignitaries of the Alawi [Nusayri] sect in Syria, take this opportunity to bring to your attention and the attention of your party the following:
1_ The Alawi [Nusayri] people, who have preserved their independence year after year with great zeal and sacrifices, are different from the Sunni Muslims. They were never subject to the authority of the cities of the interior.
2_ The Alawis refused to be annexed to Muslim Syria because, in Syria, the official religion of the state is Islam, and according to Islam, the Alawis are considered infidels.
3_ The granting of independence to Syria and abolishing the mandate constitute a good example of socialist principles in Syria. But absolute independence means the control by some Muslim [Sunni] families of the Alawi people of Cilicia, al Iskandarun [Alexandretta], and the Nusayri Mountains. As to the presence of a parliament and constitutional government [in Syria], that does not represent individual freedom. This parliamentary rule is no more than false appearance without any value. In truth, it covers up a regime dominated by religious fanaticism against the minorities. Do French leaders want the Muslims to have control over the Alawi people in order to throw them into misery?
4_ The spirit of fanaticism imbedded in the hearts of the Arab Muslims against everything that is non-Muslim has been perpetually nurtured by the Islamic religion. There is no hope that the situation will ever change. Therefore, the abolishing of the mandate will expose the minorities in Syria to the dangers of death and annihilation, irrespective of the fact that such abolition will annihilate the freedom of thought and belief. We can sense today how Muslim citizens of Damascus force the Jews who live among them to sign a document pledging that they will not send provisions to their ill-fated brethren in Palestine. The condition of the Jews in Palestine is the strongest and most explicit evidence of the military of the Islamic issue vis-a-vis those who do not belong to Islam. These good Jews contributed to the Arabs with civilisation and peace, scattered gold, and established prosperity in Palestine without harming anyone or taking anything by force, yet Muslims declared holy war against them and never hesitated in slaughtering their women and children, despite the presence of England in Palestine and France in Syria. Therefore, a dark fate awaits the Jews and other minorities in case the mandate is abolished and Muslim Syria is united with Muslim Palestine. The union of the two countries is the ultimate goal of the Muslim Arabs.
5_ We appreciate the noble feeling which motivates you to defend Syrian people and your desire to realise the independence of Syria. But at present, Syria is still far off from the noble goal you trying to achieve, because it is still subject to the religious feudalistic spirit. We do not think that the French government and French Socialist Party intend to offer the Syrians an independence whose application will only mean the enslavement of the Alawi people and the exposure of the minorities to the dangers of death and annihilation. As to the demand of the Syrians to bring the Alawi people into union with Syria, we believe it is impossible that you will accept or approve such unions. For if your noble principles support the idea of freedom, such principles will never allow a people to stifle the freedom, of another people by forcing it to unite with them.
6_ You may think that it is possible to ensure the rights of the Alawis and the minorities by a treaty. We assure you that treaties have no value in relation to the Islamic mentality in Syria. We have previously seen this situation in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, which did not prevent the Iraqis from slaughtering the Asyrians and the Yezidis.
The Alawi people, whom we, the undersigned, represent in this memorandum, appeal to the French government and the French Socialist Party and request from them a guarantee of their freedom and independence within their small territory, and place them in the hands of the French Socialist leaders. The Alawi people are certain that they will find a strong and faithful support for a loyal and friendly people threatened by death and annihilation and who have offered France tremendous services.
Signatories
Aziz Agha al Hawwash
Muhammad Bey Junaid
Sulaiman al Murshid
Mahmud Agha Jadid
Sulaiman al Asad
Muhammad Sulaiman al Ahmed.[31]
The memorandum reveals that the Nusayri leaders feared and detested the Sunni Syrian nationalists, and felt that perpetuation of the French mandate was the only way to save their state from union with Syria. The most revealing thing in this historic memorandum is that the Nusayris (Alawis) speak of themselves not as Muslims, but as aliens to Islam, and that the Muslims consider them (Nusayris) to be infidels. The Nusayris clearly feared the religious fanaticism of the Muslims as a threat to their existence as a minority.
They looked upon themselves as a minority with its own distinctive cultural ethos. For his reason they sympathised with the Jews in Palestine and the Assyrians and the Yezidis in Iraq who were minorities already under the rule of the dominant Muslim Sunni majority. The Nusayri leaders had no use for treaties because, as they mention, the Anglo-Iraqi treaty (1930) did not save the Assyrians from being slaughtered by the Iraqi army in the village of Summayl in 1933.
The French government was faced with a dilemma. It was trying to negotiate with Syrian delegation to achieve the independence of Syria while simultaneously trying to allay the fears of the Nusayris, whom France suspected of planning an armed revolt. This is expressed in the memorandum dated 5 June 1936 from the French Minister of foreign affairs to General Weygand, the military governor of Syria. In this memorandum, the foreign Minister told Waygand that it would be better to confirm the confidence in France of the non-Muslims elements. He suggested that the military governor inform the Nusayri dignitaries that the French government had no intention of altering the wording of the terms of their independence, as stated on the Private Regulation of 14 June 1930[32]
The national situation in Syria in the mid-1930s had changed drastically however, since the inception of the French mandate in 1920. Arab nationalist sentiment was mounting, and demands for complete independence were increasingly vehement. The use of force to suppress the Syrian nationalists and their demand for a united Syria was no longer feasible.
Following the example of Great Britain, France had to reconsider the whole situation in Syria and Lebanon, and its protection of Nusayri independence could only be interpreted by the Syrian as antagonistic to national unity. Furthermore, the confederation of the four Nusayri tribes, the Haddadin, al Khayyatin, al Kalbiyyah and al Mutawirah, whose leaders were members of the representative council of Latakia, which it was hoped would form the nucleus of an independent Nusayri state, began to lose authority, especially within the new Nusayri generation. Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, a new generation of educated Nusayris emerged who were more flexible than their fathers with respect to joining and working with the Syrian nationalists in Damascus.
The spread of elementary and secondary education, especially among the Nusayris, began to threaten the traditional Nusayri tribal cohesion, forcing the French government to find a better and a more acceptable substitute for the mandate. When Nusayri leaders found no positive response by the French government to their request for complete independence and learned that France was about to sign a treaty with the Syrian nationalists that would create a united Syria including the Nusayri state, they appealed to the French authorities to allow them to send a Nusayri delegation to participate in the Syrian-French negotiations in Paris.
The French minister of foreign affairs, Delbos, informed the high commissioner in Beirut that, while the French government appreciated the Nusayris’ confidence in France, it would be better not to encourage them to demand from the French government what “this government cannot fulfil.” On answer to the appeal of the president of the representative council, Ibrahim al Kinj, that a Nusayri delegation be sent to Paris, Delbos wrote to the high commissioner to inform al Kinj that questions concerning Latakia would in time be discussed by the high commissioner and those Nusayris directly affected by those questions.[33]
The declaration of the French government in June 1936 of its intention to create a state of a united Syria apparently convinced the Nusayri leaders that they were fighting a losing battle, but still they did not give up hope. Instead, they resorted to a new stratagem. On 24 June 1936, they informed the French government that if an independent Nusayri territory separate from Syria was not feasible from an international point of view, they would agree to negotiate with Lebanon concerning a possible union with that country that would guarantee them autonomy under French protection.
In a letter dated 25 June 1936, the president of the representative council, Ibrahim al Kinj, reminded French Foreign Minister Delbos that France had promised independence to the Nusayris and should not sacrifice the Nusayris to placate their enemies. Al Kinj added that union with Lebanon would be more feasible than union with Syria because the nation, like their own land, consisted of minorities[34]
The Nusayris reasons for desiring union with Lebanon were these: under the Ottoman rule, the sanjaq (a province under the direct authority of the sultan in Istanbul) of Latakia and part of the sanjaq of Tripoli had been part of the province of Beirut; their country had always had strong trade relations with Lebanon; the laws of the Nusayri state and those of Lebanon were similar; and union with Lebanon would increase the largest country of minorities in the Middle East, with a population of almost 1,200 000, nearly balancing that of Syria, whose population in the 1930s was 1,700 000.[35]
The Nusayris appeal for union with Lebanon was submitted to the high commissioner in a memorandum dated 20 August 1936. The high commissioner in turn referred the memorandum to the foreign minister with a letter attached; this letter stated that the memorandum had already been submitted to the Maronite patriarch and to the president of the Lebanese Republic, but did not indicate the response of either man. It should be pointed out that two Nusayri members of the representative council of the Nusayri state favoured union with Syria.[36]
The appeals of the Nusayri leaders to the French government to maintain the mandate and prevent the union of their state with the rest of Syria were to no avail. World War II put an end to the mandate and the French presence in Syria. At long last Syria, including the Nusayri territory, became an independent state, and on 5 April 1946, the last French and British withdrew. In that year Sulaiman al Murshid revolted against a new independent state, but was captured, tried, and hanged. Apparently, the hope of an independent state, a Nusayri state, was shattered. But as the post war history of Syria shows, although the Nusayris did not achieve independence, they one day became the rulers of Syria. Sulaiman al Asad, one of the signatories of the memorandum to the French government requesting that France not to give up the mandate, could not have dreamed that one day his own son , Hafiz, would be the president of Syria. Thus what Sulaiman al Asad and his colleagues failed to achieve was finally accomplished by the young Nusayris. The once despised and persecuted heretical sect, whose leaders would have been satisfied with an autonomous state separate from Syria, became masters of all Syria.[37]
[1] For the territorial division of Syria consult A. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: Oxford University Press, 1946); Hasan al Hakim, al Watha’iq al Tarikhiyyah al Muta’alliqah bi al Qadiyyah al Suriyyahh (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1974), 254; Kawtharani, Bilad al Sham, 220-21; Dhuqan Qarqut, Tatawwur al Harakah al Wataniyyah fi Suriyyahh (Beirut: Dar al Talia, 1975), 61; and Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étranères, Serie E-Levant-Syrie-Lebanon, Paris vol. 125.
[2] Yusuf al Hakim, Suriyyah, 52-53; and Cheikho, “Jawlah fi al Dawlah al Alawiyyah,” al Mashriq 22, no.7 (1924), 481-95.
[3] Gubser, “The Alawites of Syria,” 40.
[4] Tabithah Petran, Syria: A Modern History (London: Ernest Ben Ltd., 1972), 62; and Nikolas van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 18.
[5] Kawtharani, Bilad al Sham, 211.
[6] Sheikh Mahmud al Salih, al Naba al Yaqin an al Alawiyyin (n.p.: n.p., 1961), 127.
[7] Al Hakim, Suriyyahh, 14 and 91.
[8] Ibid., 114; and al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 68-69.
[9] Qarqut, Tatawwur al Harakah, 32.
[10] Al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 69.
[11] Abdul Latif al Yunus, Thawrat al Sheikh Salih al Ali (Damascus: Dar al Yaqza al Arabiyya, 1961), 107; Badawi, Madhahib al Islamiyyin, 2:500-1; al Sharif, al Alawiyyun Man Hum wa Ayna Hum, 110-11; al Salih, al Naba al Yaqin, 125-26; al Hariri, al Alawiyyun al Nusayriyyun, 221-26; and Ali Rida, Qissat al Kifah al Watani fi Suriyyah Askariyyan wa Siyasiyyan hatta al Jala (Halab: al Matba’ah al Hadithah, 1979), 23.
[12] Badawi, Madhahib al Islamiyyin, 2:501; and al Yunus, Thawrat al Sheikh Salih al Ali, 107.
[13] Al Yunus, Thawrat al Sheikh Salih al Ali, 72-85.
[14] Badawi, Madhahib al Islamiyyin, 2:500.
[15] Ibid., 501.
[16] Jacquot, L’État des Alaouites, 15.
[17] Al Sharif, al Alawiyyu: Man Hum wa Ayna Hum, 110-11.
[18] Al Yunus, Thawrat al Sheikh Salih al Ali, 219-28; Badawi, Madhahib al Islamiyyin, 2:503-05; and al Hariri, al Alawiyyun al Nusayriyyun, 223-24.
[19] Al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 73.
[20] Ibid., and Rida, Qissat al Kifah, 34.
[21] Al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 74-75.
[22] Al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 74; and Kawtharani, Bilad al Sham, 372.
[23] Rida, Qissat al Kifah, 32; Kawtharani, Bilad al Sham, 372-73; and Weulersse, Le Pays des Alouites, 118.
[24] See the report of the British consul in Damascus to his government in British Archives Fo 225/226, dated 10 October 1944, and in the Arabic magazine al Tadamun, 2, no. 68 (28 July 1984): 36-37.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Kawtharani, Bilad al Sham, 235-36; Qarqut, Tatawwur al Harakah, 50-58; and al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 81-82, 85, 88.
[27] Archives du Ministère des Affaires Érangères, Levant, Syrie-Leban, Paris, file no. 510, 114, document 124.
[28] Ibid., file 492, p. 193, Document 412.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., file 492, 53.
[31] On Sulaiman al Murshid, see Khayr al Din al Zirrikli, Qamus al Alam (Beirut: Dar al Ilm li al Malayin, 1979), 3:170; al Tadamun 2, no. 68, 28 July 1984, 36-37; and Stephen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 344, where the author describes al Murshid as “the obese and half-shrewd, half-crazy god Sulaiman al Murshid.” For the memorandum submitted to Blum, see Archives du Ministère, Paris, file 3547; al Hariri, al Alawiyyun al Nusayriyyun , 228-35; and Mujahid al Amin, al Nusayriyyah (al Alawiyyun), Aqa’iduhum, Tarikhukum, waqi’uhum (Beirut: Dar al Fiqh, nod.), 72-73. Cf. Gubser, “The Alawites of Syria,” 24.
[32] Archives du Ministère, files 492 and 493, which contains cable no. 347-49, dated 2 July 1936, sent by the French minister of foreign affairs to the French high commissioner in Beirut. Cf. al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 92.
[33] Archives du Ministère, files 492 and 493, including cable no. 557 from Delbos to the French high commissioner, dated 25 August 1936; Arabic excerpts of the same are in al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 90, 92-93.
[34] Archive du Ministère, E. 412.2, file 393, 8 and file 493, 7; and al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 94.
[35] Archive du Ministère, file no. 493, 229. The letter of the High commissioner to the foreign minister is no. 852, dated 28 August 1936.
[36] Al Din, al Nusayriyyah, 74-75.
[37] Al Hariri, al Alawyiyyun al Nusayriyyun, 233-34.